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Abstract 
The origins of this Special Issue of Theoretical Criminology can be located in a ‘Modernizing 
Criminal Justice’ conference that we both attended in London in June 2002. The high-profile 
event was co-sponsored by John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, the 
Metropolitan Police and the FBI. Broadcasting crews were on hand to digest the plenary 
speeches of senior representatives of the British government, the judiciary and law 
enforcement agencies. It was also a highly corporate event, promoting the commercial 
products of global security and IT companies specializing in criminal justice ‘problem 
solving’. The opening session of the conference featured a slow motion replay of the 9/11 
attacks on the Twin Towers with a voice-over informing the audience that the course of 
criminal justice had changed forever. This ‘post 9/11’ global war on crime and terrorism 
theme echoed throughout the plenary speeches and keynote sessions. What was striking was 
the relegation of the scheduled criminology workshops to the margins of the conference. This 
set off a discussion between us, during a coffee break, about why academic criminological 
knowledge was extraneous to the interests of the policy audiences brought together by this 
conference. And, of course, this quickly moved to discussion of whether criminologists 
should have a central place in such a forum. But while this is how our interest in criminology 
and public policy was initially sparked, we later found ourselves trying to pinpoint, more 
systematically, the different positions criminologists have taken on questions of their 
relevance and status within larger public policy debates.2 Our purposes in this introduction, 
and in the Special Issue that follows, are twofold. One aim is to outline a range of views that 
have been offered by academic criminologists on the discipline’s public status and its 
relationship to public policy formation and intellectual practice. A second goal is to argue the 
need for a diversity of ‘public criminologies’ wherein explicit value is placed on moving 
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policies in more progressive directions. Our own point of view is that much more could be 
done than at present, particularly since there would seem to be broad criminological 
consensus about many policy issues facing us including punitive policies around the globe as 
well as the detrimental consequences of a range of harms and risks. 
 
 
Introduction 
The origins of this Special Issue can be located in a ‘Modernizing Criminal Justice’ 
conference that we both attended in London in June 2002. The high-profile event was co-
sponsored by John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, the Metropolitan Police and 
the FBI. Broadcasting crews were on hand to digest the plenary speeches of senior 
representatives of the British government, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. It was 
also a highly corporate event, promoting the commercial products of global security and IT 
companies specializing in criminal justice ‘problem solving’. The opening session of the 
conference featured a slow motion replay of the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers with a 
voice-over informing the audience that the course of criminal justice had changed forever. 
This ‘post 9/11’ global war on crime and terrorism theme echoed throughout the plenary 
speeches and keynote sessions. What was striking was the relegation of the scheduled 
criminology workshops to the margins of the conference. This set off a discussion between 
us, during a coffee break, about why academic criminological knowledge was extraneous to 
the interests of the policy audiences brought together by this conference. And, of course, this 
quickly moved to discussion of whether criminologists should have a central place in such a 
forum. But while this is how our interest in criminology and public policy was initially 
sparked, we later found ourselves trying to pinpoint, more systematically, the different 
positions criminologists have taken on questions of their relevance and status within larger 
public policy debates.2 Our purposes in this introduction, and in the Special Issue that 
follows, are twofold. One aim is to outline a range of views that have been offered by 
academic criminologists on the discipline’s public status and its relationship to public policy 
formation and intellectual practice. A second goal is to argue the need for a diversity of 
‘public criminologies’ wherein explicit value is placed on moving policies in more 
progressive directions. Our own point of view is that much more could be done than at 
present, particularly since there would seem to be broad criminological consensus about 
many policy issues facing us including punitive policies around the globe as well as the 
detrimental consequences of a range of harms and risks. 
3 
 
 
 
In proceeding, then, we start with a short survey of several influential views that have 
appeared in print about criminology’s public status or lack thereof; although to some extent 
interweaving the two, we move from perspectives expressed in Britain to positions that 
appeared in the US context. We characterize one set of explanations as sociological and 
another as data related. Next, we provide a brief description of the articles that appear in this 
Special Issue and how we think they contribute to the question at hand. Finally, we return to 
the question of public criminologies writ large. 
 
Meeting at the crossroads of public criminology 
 
David Garland and Richard Sparks (2000) have taken a predominantly sociological approach 
to analysing the question of academic criminology’s relationship to public policy and public 
debates. They were themselves stimulated to confront the challenges facing late modern 
criminology by reading Margaret Zahn’s (1999) ASC Presidential Address in which she 
reflected on the future of criminology as an academic discipline from the perspective of 
a public policy actor and as a contributor to the building of ‘just communities’. It is worth 
noting that Zahn’s and Garland and Sparks’ deliberations pre-dated Michael Burawoy’s 
clarion call for a ‘public sociology’ that contributes to ‘a triple dialogue—a dialogue among 
sociologists, between sociologists and publics and most importantly within publics 
themselves’ (2005b: 71). For Burawoy, the responsibilities and reach of ‘public sociology’ 
distinguished it, in the academic division of labour (and knowledge claims), from 
‘professional’, ‘policy’ and ‘critical’ sociologies (see Burawoy, 2004, 2005a, 
2005b, see also Gans, 2002). This initiated a wide-ranging and committed debate in various 
sociological forums and publications (see, for example, American Journal of Sociology 
(2005), British Journal of Sociology (2005), Critical Sociology (2005), Social Forces (2004), 
Social Problems (2004)). 
 
Garland and Sparks’ historical reference point is the immediate post-war period when British 
criminology was ‘an integral part’ of policy making and practice and also influenced public 
deliberations. An elite of academics, policy makers, senior practitioners and opinion formers 
synthesized criminological scholarship and policy to promote enlightened practices. It also 
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helped that this institutional epistemology was in tune with the broader governmental 
rationalities of the post-war social democratic welfare state, and that policy making was 
insulated from the realm of electoral politics and public opinion (see also Reiner, 1988; 
Loader and Sparks, 2004). Over the last several decades, though, Sparks and Garland posit 
that contemporary Anglo-American criminology came to be marked by a blatant 
contradiction. On the one hand, it is in vigorous health having established itself as a 
distinctive professional field in sections of the academy. University degree programmes, 
faculty posts and specialist research centres involving criminology have increased in number 
and kind. The membership of professional associations has also grown; national and 
international conferences are well attended; and there are numerous specialist journals and 
books published by prestigious academic presses. With such rapid expansion it could be 
assumed that criminologists would play a central role in policy development and public 
debate. On the other hand, with the advancement of neo-liberalism and neoclassicism, 
Garland and Sparks cautioned criminologists against making overly confident assumptions 
about the future. For what had gradually happened was a noticeable decline in public 
understanding of and engagement with academic criminological knowledge. With notable 
exceptions, criminologists have had ‘limited success in shaping the public discussion of “its” 
uses and its faltering influence on public policy and decision-making’ (Garland and Sparks, 
2000: 190; see also Zimring, 1996, Murphy and Stenning, 1999). Late modernity has 
produced new crime problems that have had significant implications for ‘the intellectual 
dispositions, strategic aims and political constraints that criminology inevitably entails’ 
(Garland and Sparks, 2000: 189). Specifically, the collective experience of having to adjust to 
the threat posed by living in an environment disordered by crime and delinquency has 
generated high levels of crime consciousness and a punitive public mood. The categorizations 
that a generation of post-war criminologists took for granted have been sidelined by (a) the 
politicization of crime fears (b) victim-oriented criminal justice policy shifts and (c) the 
extension of private sector involvement in crime control and the delivery of criminal justice 
services. Criminologists have had to confront the embarrassing fact that in a society 
saturated with ‘crime talk’, they have utmost difficulty in communicating with politicians, 
policy makers, professionals and the public. Criminological reasoning is now mediated and 
contested by a range of vociferous interest groups, activists and a multitude of institutional 
actors and public opinions. And criminologists are alienated from late modern political 
culture because crime, policing and punishment are defining electoral issues. Garland and 
Sparks also cautioned that in the academy, criminology’s traditional analytical 
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categorizations are being challenged through actuarial perspectives and other academic 
disciplines that are addressing the problem of crime through the frameworks of regulation, 
governance, risk and security (see also O’Malley, 1996; Braithwaite, 2000). They concluded 
by laying out the strategic choices confronting academic criminology. It could turn inwards, 
with practitioners insisting that their key role is to produce the research findings that will 
generate evidence-led recommendations for policy makers. The problem with this is that 
criminologists will continue to respond to the government’s crime control priorities rather 
than articulating a broader criminological agenda and they would have little to no control 
over how their data will be used. There are, therefore, serious political limits to the ‘expert 
role’ of policy criminologists. For Garland and Sparks the cultural centrality of crime was ‘an 
opportunity for criminology to embrace a more critical, more public, more wide-ranging role’ 
(2000: 201). Criminologists cannot sidestep their responsibility as citizens to participate in 
the broader public conversation. To do so, they would have to sharpen their reflexive 
understanding of ‘the way that crime is experienced, represented and regulated’ (2000: 202) 
and the broader shifts in political culture. 
 
Their sense that dominant criminological concepts were out of step with political 
developments meant the discipline had to replenish itself intellectually. It could do so by 
engaging with the cross-cutting explanatory frameworks of contemporary social theorists 
such as Giddens, Bauman, Rose and others who are asking new questions and making 
‘connections between apparently unconnected phenomena in ways that allow substantive 
research to grasp more perspicuously the peculiarities of its current environment’ (Garland 
and Sparks, 2000: 203; see also Nelken, 1996). Although underdeveloped, Garland and 
Sparks did touch on the differences between the tasks of professional, policy-oriented 
criminology and critical criminologies and their preferred ‘public criminology’. 
 
But, in contrast to the range of discussion which met Michael Burawoy’s call for a public 
sociology, there has been little sustained discussion within criminology of the issues raised by 
Garland and Sparks. And this silence in itself may reflect broader ambivalence about whether 
‘criminology’ should be regarded as a free-standing academic discipline. Jock Young (2003, 
2004) was one of the few criminologists who did respond from the viewpoint of critical 
criminology. Young also took a sociological approach to understanding criminology’s 
relationship to public policy, albeit stressing quite different developments. He cautioned 
against intellectual histories that constructed a radiant moment of criminological influence. 
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For him, the emergence in the 1970s of a radical criminology committed to a full social 
theory of deviance was a necessary response to the limitations of the postwar correctionalist 
ethos propagated by an intellectual-administrative elite. And, of course, Young’s broader 
intention was to re-align the analysis of crime and social control with post-positivist 
sociology (see Cohen, 1996). The result has been the creation of an international network of 
critical scholarship that not only redefined the field of study but insinuated many of its key 
ideas into public consciousness (see Carrington and Hogg, 2002). Late modern criminology, 
for Young, is fragmented and characterized by a multitude of new voices as a result of the 
collapse of boundaries over who is authorized to speak about crime and on what terms. And 
this democratization has impacted on the institutional knowledge base of policy making, 
politics and public opinion in unpredictable ways. In the 1980s, right realist and 
administrative criminologists did manage to construct a lucrative policy base by working 
within the groove of an increasingly punitive criminal justice system. Carefully cultivated 
relationships with the newsmedia, public commentators and political networks allowed them 
to redefine the terms of the debate about criminal justice policy and social policy. Young 
insists that even in the most hostile of political and ideological circumstances, critical 
criminology has continued to act as a counter-voice to free market and neo-conservative anti-
crime ideologies. 
 
Other critical criminologists are more pessimistic. Hil and Robertson (2003), Walters (2003) 
and Hillyard et al. (2004), for example, locate what they view as the corrupted state of 
criminological scholarship with the strengthening of market forces in higher education and 
administrative criminology’s orientation towards the research needs of the criminal justice 
system (see also Chan, 2000). The construction of a market in crime control research and 
practice has strip-mined the discipline’s broader intellectual integrity and academic prestige. 
It is peopled with ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘consultants’ who are willing to sell their ‘expertise’ 
and provide ‘off-the- shelf’ evaluation packages to law enforcement and criminal justice 
agencies on a national and international basis. Political clientalism in the commissioning 
process across a range of managerialized policy sites also means that critical criminologists 
have difficulty in accessing funding ‘to conduct rigorous, challenging and socially relevant 
research that will alleviate rather than exacerbate problems caused by conventional crime, 
while simultaneously confronting the social harms generated by the powerful’ (Hillyard et al., 
2004: 385). From this perspective, de-politicized definitions of ‘policy expertise’, ‘relevance’ 
and ‘application’ are geared towards funding the building of better mousetraps while 
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neutralizing the possibility of critical investigation of the state’s surveillance, criminalization 
and punishment capacities and highly sensitive ‘crime sites’. 
 
Young also noted the influence that feminist criminologists have had in placing the needs of 
victims of violence on the criminal justice agenda. He was correct to note that feminist 
criminologists, as well as criminologists who called attention to issues of racial 
discrimination in and outside the academy, had been influencing policy debates in the same 
decades that Garland and Sparks characterized as ones of declining criminological relevance. 
Both in Britain and in the USA, social movements of the 1960s and 1970s related to 
feminism and racial justice had and continue to affect criminology, and vice versa, as policy 
makers have been compelled to recognize and to try to deal more sensitively with issues like 
domestic violence, sexual harassment and hate crimes (and, in general, to recognize the role 
of gendered, racial and class-related biases in criminal justice practices). From the work of 
Pat Carlen and Betsy Stanko (among others) in Britain to that of Meda Chesney-Lind, Kim 
Cook, Kathy Daly, and Natalie Sokoloff (among others) in the USA, it was obvious that 
feminist criminologists were immersed in efforts to change policy—because they brought 
public attention to these issues. Nor would cultural consciousness about racial profiling and 
the persistence of racist policing around the globe have emerged without a combination of 
social movement and criminologists’ attention to these problems. Yet as detailed in 
Theoretical Criminology’s recent Special Issue on feminist restorative justice (2005), many 
feminist criminologists in the UK and Australia, as well as in the USA, are now concerned 
about so much influence in the areas of domestic violence and rape having been exerted that 
strange alliances between feminists and the conservative neoliberal state were forged. As 
Kristin Bumiller (2007) argues in a forthcoming book summarizing this position, feminist 
scholars, however well intentioned, were sometimes unaware of the racially biased and 
punitive outcomes to which their interventions on behalf of women might produce. Here, 
then, is a feminist position that expresses concern not so much about whether criminologists 
have exerted influence but how, and with what effect. Other feminists, like Susan Caringella 
(2007), express even another concern: according to Caringella, even apparent ‘progress in 
policy areas like rape reform have been stymied by the strength of conservative backlash in 
the US and eslewhere. This is also a stark reminder that there is no easy relationship between 
policy recommendations, formulation, implementation and outcomes. 
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Like Garland and Sparks, Young also expressed concern about the state of the discipline. For 
him manifest failures of the contemporary criminological imagination were associated with a 
discernible turning away from sociology (see also Savelsberg and Sampson, 2002) and a 
noticeable lack of interest in new developments in philosophy, political science and cultural 
studies. Consequently, mainstream criminological discourse is not capable of describing, 
never mind altering social circumstances. What is needed is a theoretical position which can 
enter into the real world of existential joy, fear, false certainty and doubt, which can seek to 
understand the sub-cultural projects of people in a world riven with inequalities of wealth and 
uncertainties of identity. What we need is an ethnographic method which can deal with 
reflexivity, contradiction, tentativeness, change opinion, posturing, concealment, which is 
sensitive to the way people write and rewrite their personal narratives. It will not be solved by 
fake scientificity but by a critical ethnography honed to the potential of human creativity 
and meaning. (Young, 2004: 29) 
 
In both the UK and USA, professional and policy-oriented criminologists, involved in their 
own debate about the state of the discipline, insist that its lack of relevance and practical 
impact relates to the unaddressed structural weaknesses of the evidence base. Here, then, is 
quite a different ‘dismal science’ position. Tending to presume agreed on definitions of what 
constitutes reliable and usable social science data, these criminologists argue that the 
discipline has not offered expert users convincing research findings—and that therein lies a 
main cause of marginalization and lack of public expert status. For example, Paul Wiles 
(2002) writing as someone who had made the move in the UK from academic criminologist 
to senior Home Office civil servant, argues that for criminology to contribute to public policy 
it must produce expert knowledge that is useful to policy makers. The defining characteristics 
and motivations of contemporary British criminology mean that it does not possess the 
evidence-based knowledge on offences, offenders, victims and their interconnections that 
would allow it to guide policy making. The methodological preferences and ideological 
biases in British criminology help to explain the poor state of public knowledge on key policy 
issues. The rapid university-based growth of the discipline has resulted in the privatization of 
criminological labour. In order to establish their academic credentials and professional 
careers, criminologists are: specializing in narrow, irrelevant research areas and addressing 
their work to a primary audience of their peers and students. Defensive disciplinary 
boundaries are being built and practitioners are obsessed with separatist disputes. They are 
sheltered from ‘the wider blasts of criticism on which all good social science depends’ and 
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are unable ‘to express their ideas in everyday language and summarize complex evidence in 
straightforward points’ (Wiles, 2002: 248; see also Wiles, 2004). Strikingly, analogous 
arguments have appeared in the US context; one can discern the parameters of an emerging 
debate through intermittent exchanges of views about whether criminological research is 
‘relevant’. Among US policy-oriented criminologists, widespread agreement seems to exist 
that criminology has a credibility problem with its authority claims and ‘irrelevant’ research. 
Criminology’s reputation, according to Austin, has been compromised because the majority 
of published studies ‘are so deeply flawed that they are essentially useless’ (2003: 558). 
Conceptual imprecision, methodological deficiencies and undisclosed bias have resulted in 
the dissemination of ‘irresponsible and highly misleading conclusions’. This ‘junk science’ 
has damaged criminal justice policy and practice and communities and wasted scarce public 
resources. Criminology has also been impaired by overdependence on a narrow range of 
funding sources that have used ‘a small but highly influential circle of criminologists’ to 
‘exert a disproportionate influence on what is funded and who gets funded’ (2003: 569). He 
also strongly hints that criminological research findings have been manipulated by grant 
holders towards the needs of funding agencies and political agendas. For Charles Tittle, there 
is not a single criminological issue about which ‘even a modestly demanding critic could be 
convinced’ (2004: 1641). This is because ‘research is limited, and our data are always 
incomplete, error prone, and accepted as supporting an argument if it simply shows 
something “better than chance”’ (2004: 1641). This echoes some of Lawrence Sherman’s 
(2005) concerns that much that passes for criminological research is either impressionist 
description or misleading in terms of its analysis and conclusions. What might be done to 
remedy this state of affairs? One notable response has been to argue the case for further 
validation of criminology’s expert status. Austin (2003) advocates the utilization of 
innovative research designs, the rigorous analysis of research data and conduct of replication 
studies, diversification of funding streams and enhanced regulation and oversight of 
professional practice and standards. For Cullen (2005), there is a need to develop a fine-
grained understanding of when and why criminology has mattered to policy and practice. 
 
Part of this professionalization process is resisting the temptation to over-sell the policy 
relevance of the discipline. Tittle, for example, warns criminologists: “are as likely to be 
wrong as right and in the process they can easily cause damage. Here we are not talking about 
innocuous outcomes but instead about matters of human life, safety and freedom. Being 
wrong can be very costly”.(2004: 1641) 
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The advocacy and bias that inevitably flows from and constructs public engagement 
endangers the ‘precious little’ public legitimacy that is currently accorded to social scientists. 
Criminologists do not have ‘that body of reliable knowledge and the public pretense that we 
do actually undermines any hope of influencing society or of obtaining the support necessary 
for developing such a knowledge’ (2004: 1641). The public: “ know we have weak 
knowledge and in response they accord us little credibility. We, in turn, continually 
undermine the little respect we might otherwise have by trying to promote our ideas (a form 
of ideology) in the guise of superior knowledge. Most of the time we actually do not know as 
much as we pretend and even when there is a chance we might provide or compile useful 
information, people do not trust us”. (Tittle, 2004: 1642) 
 
Professional criminologists should also accept the reality that ‘most policy issues are moral 
questions that cannot be answered by theory or for that matter by research. … Moreover the 
idea that scholarly knowledge and this knowledge alone should determine policy outcomes is 
naïve’ (Laub, 2004: 18). However, for others criminology, or at least some sections of 
criminology, should split off and develop into a technical science. Sherman (2005) argues 
for a technically sophisticated ‘experimental criminology’ that would provide ‘unbiased 
empirical guidance’ to inform key policy choices in crime and criminal justice. He 
acknowledges that even a methodologically sophisticated criminology would face an uphill 
battle influencing the contemporary policy environment. Usefulness ‘does not guarantee that 
the information will be used’ (Sherman, 2005: 130, emphasis in original). ‘Experimental 
criminology’ has the advantage that it relates directly to the world of practitioners, aiming to 
provide them with ‘what works’ choices and has the potential to excite the public imagination 
with thought-provoking ‘discoveries’ about criminal behaviour and crime prevention. There 
is the obvious implication that some domains of criminological inquiry are more amenable to 
experimental methods than others but this has yet to be specified. Clarke (2004) moves this 
agenda one step further, arguing that criminology must become an applied science whose 
core task is to explain crime (rather than criminality) and how crime is committed (rather 
than why it is committed). It should also be dedicated to developing effective crime control 
strategies. To do so, it will have to disconnect itself from social theory and link up with 
 
disciplines such as economics, biology, demography, geographical mapping, town planning 
and engineering. It will have to integrate with industry and commerce rather than the criminal 
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justice system in order to comprehend how crime is being transformed by new technologies 
and globalization. This would, of course, make most of criminology’s preferred perspectives 
and methodologies redundant. If criminologists do not become competent crime analysts 
and/or policy thinkers, they will be replaced by a new generation of ‘crime scientists’. This 
brief summary of some of the most stimulating statements raises a whole series of issues 
regarding the public credibility and relevance, academic prestige and indeed possible futures 
of the discipline. 
 
Key Themes 
 
The themed articles in this Special Issue address many of the points raised in the previous 
discussion. In a bracing opening discussion, Elliott Currie presents the case for a ‘public 
criminology’. He notes how the discipline has beenincreasingly marginal to wider public 
discussions about crime and seemingly incapable of influencing criminal justice policies and 
legislative programmes. This is despite the fact that professional criminologists have 
produced a solid body of research directly applicable to decision making across a range of 
fundamental issues. What is truly remarkable is that in an era where evidence-led policy 
making is extolled, populist ideas are adopted that have no solid evidence to back them up 
and research findings have been misapplied. Some of this can be blamed on the extremely 
hostile neo-liberal political climate. 
 
In addition, though, the discipline must also bear some responsibility for its self-imposed 
marginalization in public debates. Currie argues that criminologists may be failing in their 
broader civic duty to act as public knowledge workers because professional criminology, 
particularly as practised in US research universities, has encouraged narrow and internally 
oriented definitions of scholarship. These universities tend to reward technical research and 
high degrees of specialization. Thus, criminologists may be actively deterred by the 
university reward system from engaging in public debate and influencing wider audiences. 
And he cites examples of how criminologists are effectively punished by the academy for 
being too relevant. According to Currie, professional closure, exemplified by 
incomprehensible methodologies and impenetrable techno-language, is a primary reason why 
public debates on crime and criminal justice policy remain dominated by essentially 
counter-criminological perspectives. In the concluding section of his article, Currie details, 
more specifically, ways that criminology can develop a language to meet its wider 
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responsibility to raise the standard of public debate about crime and criminal justice. And of 
course this does foreground the need for a discussion regarding the relationship between 
professional and moral values and ethics. 
 
Gregg Barak has been a significant and consistent advocate of a criminology committed both 
to research and to active engagement with the newsmedia on issues of crime and criminal 
justice. Despite the transformation of criminological ideas into valuable media commodities, 
professional criminologists have not usually been key sources on whom journalists rely. On 
the contrary, most sections of the media draw disproportionately on the expert status and 
public authority of uniformed criminal justice professionals and criminal lawyers. This results 
in public perceptions of crime that are not founded in criminological analyses and research 
results. But, drawing on his own experience as a radio show host through the OJ Simpson 
criminal trial in the USA, Barak argues that criminologists’ marginality within newsmedia 
discourse is not inevitable. Rather, a central task for criminologists is to convince journalists 
and reporters that we have important analyses and research findings to discuss. Barak realizes 
that the task is daunting in a volatile 24/7 media environment where the crime agenda is 
routinely set or re-set by the ‘buzz thoughts’ of ‘shock jocks’, conspiracy theorists, pundits 
and aggressive spin doctors representing government agencies. He goes on to explore how a 
proactive media presence will require criminologists to skill themselves in how the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ media works and to recognize opportunities for intervening in a decisive manner in 
myriad public debates. One important implication of Barak’s article is that the next 
generation of professional criminologists will need to be educated in the latest scholarship 
and technical practices of journalism and communication and new media studies. We also 
need to consider the risks associated with the mass mediaization of criminological 
knowledge. For criminology’s ability to intervene in decisive public debates and carve out 
new public spaces—the theme of this Special Issue—the media matter. 
 
Another avenue open to reform-minded criminologists who wish to exercise a more direct 
influence on public policy is to move from the academy itself into policy-making positions. 
Indeed, as previously noted, the expansion of Anglo- American criminology has generated 
considerable movement back and forth between the academy, criminal justice agencies, 
government departments, think tanks and pressure groups. And this has in certain important 
respects produced a ‘new model’ criminologist. This also underscores the point that the 
academy is only one of many proliferating institutional sites generating and disseminating 
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criminological knowledge. In an optimistic article, then, Betsy Stanko reflects on her 
professional journey first from US to UK academy and then from the academy to her current 
position as a senior policy advisor on strategy within Scotland Yard. She provides us with 
important insights into the possibilities and constraints associated with locating oneself in 
different institutional settings. And, picking up on another point raised in our earlier 
discussion, her journey illustrates how feminist criminologists have been deeply involved in 
combining campaigning work, critiquing professional practice, sustaining an academic 
support network and formulating a distinctive criminological perspective. The focus on 
violence against women has also provided ample opportunities for engagement with the 
newsmedia. 
 
Criminologists, to accomplish change, must analyse how powerful criminal justice agencies 
‘think’ and ‘work’ in processing information and formulating a response to professional 
deficiencies that need to be redressed. In the case of violence against women, the police 
eventually realized that they had no choice but to enact reforms to close the gap between 
rhetoric and reality. This created a window of opportunity. Criminologists must also be 
prepared for sustained hard policy work and often frustrating or conflictual engagement with 
the complicated power lines and sensitivities that constitute bureau-professional landscapes. 
Stanko acknowledges that the real-time knowledge needs of her police employers now come 
first and that she may be more distant from academic criminological debates. And she does 
suggest that this distance has led to negative judgements by fellow criminologists. However, 
the payback is that she is situated at the heart of where policy happens and has access to 
information and data not readily available to academic criminologists. No doubt, a different 
kind of professional knowledge, expertise and relevance is gained in the process of 
‘translating’ feminist scholarship into the policy mentalities of an extremely powerful 
organizational culture. 
 
Tim Newburn and Trevor Jones have been at the forefront of an emergent body of 
scholarship on the dissemination of Anglo-American criminal justice policy initiatives. In 
their article, they provide a case study analysis of how the extremely influential concept of 
‘Zero Tolerance’ has travelled internationally across different public debates and policy sites. 
And they draw our attention to many intriguing issues in the materialization of significant 
policy breakthroughs. They reiterate that criminologists have had understandable difficulty in 
coming to terms with a radically altered policy environment. They also note how key US 
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think tanks have played a pivotal role in popularizing (sometimes by providing ‘sound-bite’ 
descriptions) and globalizing particular crime control policy narratives. This partly explains 
the USA being seen as ‘catching the wave’ of policy innovation and emerging as the key 
destination for ‘policy tourists’ desperately looking for the latest ‘what works’ ideas. 
A critical issue that needs to be considered in more depth is what happens when these ideas 
are ‘franchised’ into different national settings. One important outcome has been that 
indigenous criminological knowledge or criminal justice policies are parochialized. Hence 
there is the very real risk of local knowledge displacement or even replacement. This is more 
likely to happen if criminological traditions in a particular country are weak and political 
pressures to respond to public concerns about crime are strong. Then too, as Newburn and 
Jones point out, an allied issue is the sheer speed with which contradictory ideas about 
criminal justice have been circulating and connecting with each other in unexpected ways. 
Even if actual governance policies and practices do not lead to pragmatically verifiable 
results (like reductions in crime statistics), Newburn and Jones believe that concepts like 
‘Zero Tolerance’ and ‘broken windows’ should not be viewed simply as fads or rhetorical 
flourishes. Rather these concepts are ‘real’ in their cultural consequences, becoming part of 
popular consciousness and periodically migrating into other policy debates and politicians’ 
stock phrases. This means that criminologists need to pay much more attention to analysing 
how particular crime control symbols—both progressive and reactionary—have the 
ability to resonate across different jurisdictions and to re-invent themselves globally. 
 
Chris Stone’s article also addresses some of the unpredictable outcomes in the ‘doing’ of 
policy work raised by Tim Newburn and Trevor Jones and Betsy Stanko. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the campaign for stronger forms of police accountability in the USA and UK was 
primarily associated with the writings of critical police scholars; many of these scholars 
worked closely with community groups and campaigning journalists. At the time, this was 
such a politically contested issue that there seemed no possibility of significantly advancing 
core demands. This makes it all the more remarkable that, as Stone notes, robust multi-tiered 
reform programmes have now been introduced globally. He focuses on the example of 
Nigeria to indicate how meaningful police reform has taken root in the most unexpected of 
settings. Stone identifies what we might describe as a backroom process whereby original 
ideas, sometimes emanating from the work of academic criminologists, were picked up by 
and ‘cleansed’ of politics by mainstream police and public policy scholars and influential 
intermediary bodies such as the Vera Institute in New York. A series of high-profile scandals 
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and the rise of new models of public sector management provided the context for chief police 
officers to be persuaded of the necessity and benefits of increased accountability and 
transparency. Like that of Stanko and Newburn and Jones, Stone’s analysis reminds us that 
we need to take a much longer, transnational perspective when we are considering the 
balance sheet on the impact of progressive criminological ideas on particular policy sites (see 
also, Bayley. 2005, Marenin, 2005). This article also alerts us to the need to understand the 
process by which criminological ideas have voyaged from criminology to much broader and 
perhaps more politically influential global human rights, human security, ‘good governance’ 
and international assistance agendas. 
 
Casting a wide theoretical net is also what characterizes Lucia Zedner and Katja Franko Aas’ 
contributions to this Special Issue. According to Zedner, history tells us that any significant 
change in the crime environment has serious consequences for the discipline. To date, 
criminology has shown itself able to adapt to new circumstances. However, the discipline is 
now being challenged by a very different set of circumstances. In Zedner’s view, the 
traditional post-crime orientation of criminal justice has been replaced by the pre-crime logics 
of security. She examines the evidence of the shift to what she defines as a ‘security society’. 
Of course, criminologists have recently recognized that the logics, techniques and concerns of 
private security are permeating society and redefining or supplanting traditional criminal 
justice methodologies. However, we may not yet have come to terms with the implications of 
how the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ is being fought domestically. 
 
Here, criminology is now directly confronted with the discourses and policy analysis of 
competitor disciplines both old (international political science) and emergent (counter-
terrorism and national security studies). And going back to a point made by Currie, if 
criminology is to adapt to new circumstances, it must resist the inflexibilities associated with 
institutionalization and disciplinization. For Zedner, it must be reflexive, retaining an 
openness to new ideas and drawing upon the intellectual resources of other disciplines. In 
addition, it urgently needs to generate the research data on security developments and 
securitization processes that will allow it to develop a distinctive criminological perspective. 
Finally, Zedner posits that putting criminological theory to productive work in this context 
requires analysts to engage in normative analysis and be prepared to articulate a particular 
conception of human security and justice. 
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Katja Franko Aas picks up on the many challenges of ‘doing’ criminology in a globalized 
world characterized by transnational flows of risks, threats and insecurities and a variety of 
transnational and ‘stateless’ responses. She notes that although these concerns have finally 
registered on criminologists’ research agendas, very little original empirical research has 
emerged. This has been left to human rights scholars working on refugees and migration, 
anthropologists and NGOs. In addition, virtually no effort has been expended on theorizing 
these developments (for example, criminologists have hesitated to engage with the paradoxes 
identified by globalization studies). Far more likely is that, as though nothing has changed, 
questionable criminological knowledge will be produced through the application of 
traditional perspectives. Equally damaging will be the assumption that the already under-
developed categorizations and methodologies of comparative criminology have some 21st-
century value. She analyses how multiple mobilities are undermining the taken-for-granted 
background assumptions about the ‘nation state’, ‘society’ and ‘community’. The multi-
locational arguments presented in this article raise concerns about exactly where western 
criminologists need to be conducting research if they are to understand some of the 
globalized crime problems in their own society: sub-Saharan Africa? South China coastal 
towns? The Caribbean islands? The frontier terrain between Pakistan and Afghanistan? Or 
the Mexico–USA border? If this is the case, what are the implications for what should count 
as 21st-century criminological professional competence and expertise? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, our purpose in this Special Issue is to stimulate ongoing debates about the 
relationship of Anglo-American criminology to changes in public policies. As we indicated in 
our initial discussion, we have not originated this discussion and we are aware that there are 
also many more perspectives that need to be aired in this vital debate. Interestingly, 
contemporary concerns have not only appeared in print, among sociologists and 
criminologists, but at the professional organizational levels of both fields. For example, the 
 
American Society of Criminology has entertained debates about whether and when to take 
broad public stances while the ASC’s large Division of Women and Crime now specifically 
honours feminist criminologists who have contributed to altering gender-related public 
policies in progressive directions. On the other side of the Atlantic, the British Society of 
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Criminology has found itself drawn into research-related disputes between academic 
criminologists and the Home Office, the government ‘gate-keeper’ for funding policy-related 
research on criminal justice in England and Wales. It is also noticeable how the major annual 
Anglo-American criminology conferences employ titles for sessions that do signal an 
awareness of the need to address pressing public debates. It is unfortunate that, in many 
instances, the eye-catching conference title is as far as the wider engagement goes. 
 
What we are arguing is that the present historical moment is one when public intervention 
and contributing to the actualization of concrete policy changes is especially crucial. At 
present, it seems closer to a responsibility than a luxury to value the public aspects of 
criminological labour and to call for a more precise understanding of what furthers (or 
impedes) criminologists’ attempts to have practical effects. For as Michael Burawoy contends 
about sociology so, just as plainly, do daunting challenges face criminologists as global 
inequalities have become more rather than less severe, encompassing but not limited to 
stratifications based on class; as matters of crime and punishment are dealt with, in many 
jurisdictions, more punitively than ever; as globalized terrorism stymies attempts to eradicate 
its murderous intent while reactions to terrorism have generated wars and the prioritization of 
national security over human rights and civil liberties; and as the environment continues to be 
despoiled. More precisely, though, public criminologies in pursuit of what? 
 
Returning full circle to Burawoy’s ambitious exposition, it should be emphasized that as in 
sociology, so within criminology, there are, and will be, different ways that academics can 
‘do’ public criminology and connect with multiple audiences. Similar distinctions to those 
Burawoy identified between varied types of sociological work, with dialectical relationships 
interconnecting them—public sociology, policy sociology, professional sociology and critical 
sociology—apply to criminological divisions of labour as well. This is illustrated by the array 
of articles, as just described, that comprise this volume of Theoretical Criminology. At the 
same time, though, the authors featured here point to problems specifically germane for 
criminologists. For example, Burawoy observes that public sociology involves the ability to 
bring academic knowledge to much broader audiences, as noted journalist Barbara 
Ehrenreich succeeded in doing through her accessible and best selling book Nickled and 
Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America (2001).  
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While progressively oriented criminologists have also managed to reach wide audiences 
(take, for instance, Elliott Currie’s influential 1986 treatise Confronting Crime: An American 
Challenge), Gregg Barak’s piece, as noted in the previous summary, reflects on ongoing 
efforts and limitations at present in affecting not just policy makers but the mass-mediated, 
commercialized and sceptical ‘public’ sphere. Like Barak, we believe that not only hands-on 
experience but innovative thought, research and training are needed as mass-media and 
popular culture become increasingly complex. Are there opportunities to be engaged with 
film and performance as well as radio, with blogging as well as with the circulation of 
television and print news? Evident, at a minimum, is that ‘doing’ public criminology is 
closely related to how sophisticated we can become in understanding and participating in a 
dynamically evolving range of 24/7 mass-media forums. This will not be easy because 
attempts to establish a public presence will take place against a backdrop of the thinning out 
of intellectual debate in the media and deepening public scepticism regarding ‘expert 
knowledge’. 
 
This Special Issue also exemplifies what Burawoy calls policy sociology (defined as ‘in the 
service of a goal’ and involving work with clients including governmental entities) applied 
here to policy criminology. In different contexts, both Betsy Stanko and Chris Stone describe 
having affected changes ‘from within’ to how policing operates nationally and 
internationally. Here too, though, as we have seen, dilemmas persist for professional 
criminologists interested in directly working with governmental entities, and who directly 
enter various bureau-professional policy-making settings. In the burgeoning free market of 
ideas identified by Newburn and Jones, why and how will policy makers and indeed the 
media be interested in listening to academics, particularly in situations where the agenda of 
the former and that of the latter are politically antithetical? As has been noted at various 
points in this introduction, one crucial issue facing criminologists is how to offer suggestions 
that are at once concrete and visionary enough to have a chance of resulting in actual policy 
effects. In Downsizing Prisons: How to Reduce Crime and End Mass Incarceration (2005), 
Michael Jacobson suggests drawing on practical concerns and electoral anxieties felt by 
policy makers across the political spectrum—for example, budgetary constraints and public 
opinion polls showing that Americans are now more concerned about healthcare and 
education than crime—to advocate progressive agendas like reducing states’ leviathan-size 
prison systems. This approach with its emphasis on a sophisticated understanding of and 
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ability to manipulate the pressure points of an unstable politico-policy penal environment 
may be worth investigating for whether, or not, it can be generalized to other policy contexts. 
Then, too, Burawoy’s vision of critical sociology obviously applies to criminology. Indeed, 
and of course, the term ‘critical criminology’ is by 2007 familiar to an international network 
of criminologists of diverse orientations; a section of the ASC, a journal and a European 
conference circuit, adopted this appellation years before Burawoy’s suggestion. Yet again, 
though, Burawoy’s definition of critical sociology—as ‘attempts to make professional 
sociology aware of its biases, silences, promoting new research programs built on alternative 
alternatives’ (2005a: 10)—seems particularly well suited for describing the contents of 
several articles in this Special Issue. By Burawoy’s criteria, Elliott Currie’s argument that 
many university research departments devalue public vocation is indeed a ‘critical 
criminological’ one; likewise, Lucia Zedner’s and Katja Franko Aas’ articles, in different 
ways, critique the increasing datedness of the epistemological basis of existing research 
agendas and point to the urgent need to ‘rattle the cage’ of criminological preconceptions and 
develop new interdisciplinary intellectual orientations. 
 
Last but not least, then, let us posit that a final category—amounting to yet another mode 
through which criminologists, in diverse ways, may be able to influence public policy—
should be added to Michael Burawoy’s classificatory schema and dialectical understanding, 
namely, theoretical criminology. For we wish to suggest that theory itself, with its use of 
interdisciplinary sources, probing of philosophical presumptions and foresight capacity, 
should not be left out of the picture. As the editors of Theoretical Criminology, our 
interpretation is necessarily multi-dimensional. Hardly do we feel that all inquiry ought to be 
judged by whether or not it is ‘practical’, ‘relevant’ and ‘applicable’. Quite the contrary: like 
Burawoy, we see the need to think less about policy issues and more about public matters. As 
we train the next generation of graduate students (our closest, knowable public) in crime and 
justice, theoretical inquiry and interdisciplinary analysis needs to be encouraged and 
supported rather than overlooked or taken for granted. Without strong institutional sites to 
produce theoretical and analytical knowledge work, criminological thinking will end up 
simply reacting to political events, governmental shifts, client–customer negotiations and/or 
changes in public opinion. We would not have the intellectual basis for making independent 
contributions worth listening to. This, indeed, was a major raison d’etre behind this journal’s 
own coming into existence. And it is worth remembering that the political class in many 
national settings continue to be attracted to the power of intellectual ideas rather than yet 
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another batch of policy proposals. The details of policy formulation and implementation are 
left to professional administrators and specialist advisors. Rigorous thinking is a prerequisite 
for ‘public criminology’. The array of different criminologies we have just surveyed, 
borrowing on debates already being aired in sociology and across criminology’s 
interdisciplinary perspectives, could become so fragmented from one another that they work 
at cross-purposes. But our hope is that the opposite is also possible and can be envisioned: 
different ways of doing and thinking about public criminology may be able to come together, 
dialectically, as Burawoy put it. Public criminologies need to add up to more than the sum of 
their parts if we are to ensure both the intellectual vitality and public presence of our chosen 
field of study. 
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